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Abstract 
Using recently developed industry-specific purchasing power parities (PPPs), we test for β-convergence and σ-
convergence of labor productivity at one-digit and two-digit industrial levels for 17 OECD countries. We confirm that 
the principal finding of Bernard and Jones (1996)—that total manufacturing shows little evidence of productivity 
convergence among OECD countries—is in fact supported by the data, even though their approach is flawed by the 
use of aggregate rather than industry-specific PPPs. However, we find that many two-digit manufacturing industries 
do converge. All one-digit sectors except manufacturing exhibit strong convergence trends. Convergence also occurs in 
all services industries except post and telecommunications. Respective contributions of industrial productivity growth 
and across-industry labor shifts to trends at the next aggregate level are also analyzed.
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     1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Bernard and Jones (1996, hereafter BJ), increasing atten-
tion has been drawn to productivity convergence at the disaggregate levels (see Carree
et al. 2000, Margaritis et al. 2007, among others). BJ point out that international
transfer and di®usion of technology are likely to vary in nature and intensity across sec-
tors, and thus provide a compelling argument for examining productivity convergence
at the sectoral level as well as at the economy-wide level. They examine ¯-convergence
and ¾-convergence for six one-digit sectors among 14 OECD countries over the period
1970{1987.1 Their main conclusion is that there is no evidence of convergence in man-
ufacturing and hence that the convergence trend at the aggregate level is driven by
non-manufacturing sectors, especially services.
This widely cited ¯nding of BJ, however, is challenged by Sorensen (2001), who shows
that the use of economy-wide purchasing power parities (PPPs) to convert sector-speci¯c
output quantities to a common currency seriously undermines the BJ international com-
parisons. Sorensen (2001) argues that, for international comparisons at the sectoral level,
producer prices on domestic production related to speci¯c sectors should be used, while
aggregate expenditure PPPs are calculated from the expenditure prices of a bundle of
consumption goods from all sectors. In particular, he shows that the BJ results are sensi-
tive to the choice of the PPP base year, indicating that the aggregate expenditure PPPs
are inappropriate conversion factors for sector-speci¯c productivity levels.
In their response to Sorensen (2001), Bernard and Jones (2001) write that \::: future
research is needed to construct conversion factors appropriate to each sector, and that
research relying on international comparisons of sector-speci¯c productivity and income
should proceed with caution until these conversion factors are available". As part of the
EU KLEMS project, Timmer et al. (2007) construct a set of industry-speci¯c PPPs and
provide a new database of growth accounts. In this paper, we establish the empirics on
productivity convergence at the disaggregate levels using the appropriate industry-speci¯c
PPPs.2
Focusing only on one-digit sectors can still be misleading. In 2004, for a group of
17 OECD countries included in this study, manufacturing and services accounted for,
on average, almost 90% of total output, with services alone accounting for around 70%.
As these two sectors comprise very heterogeneous industries, analysis purely on one-digit
sectors fails to account for within-sector disparities, essentially resembling the "comparing
apples to orange" problem identi¯ed by BJ. Carree et al. (2000) test convergence in
28 manufacturing industries among 18 OECD countries and Margaritis et al. (2007)
test convergence in low-tech manufacturing, high-tech manufacturing and several services
industries among 19 OECD countries.3 But again, lacking appropriate industry-speci¯c
1The six one-digit sectors are agriculture, mining, manufacturing, EGW (electricity, gas and water),
construction and services.
2Due to very limited data on capital stock, we focus on labor productivity.
3We report in this paper the results from the absolute ¯-convergence test, which directly exam-
ines whether di®erent economies are getting closer to one another. But we also tested conditional
¯-convergence hypotheses, following Margaritis et al. (2007) in choosing controlling variables. Condi-
tional ¯-convergence test examines whether economies that are farther from their steady states grow
faster than those that are nearer to their steady states. Results are available upon request.
1PPPs, these papers use aggregate PPPs, raising, most probably in a severer way, the
issue pointed out by Sorenson (2001).
Using appropriate industry-speci¯c PPPs, this paper studies productivity convergence
among 17 OECD countries for six one-digit sectors as well as two-digit industries in man-
ufacturing and services for the time period 1975-2004. The notions of ¯-convergence and
¾-convergence are tested. A counterfactual analysis is performed to assess the respective
contributions of productivity growth within individual industries and labor shifts across
industries to trends at the next aggregate level.
Section 2 discusses convergence notions and testable implications. Section 3 explains
the data source. Section 4 presents convergence test results. Section 5 provides results
from the counterfactual analysis. Section 6 proposes possible future directions.
2 Convergence Notions and Testable Implications
The ¯-convergence hypothesis proposes that economies with relatively lower initial
incomes per capita tend to growth faster than those with higher incomes. ¯-convergence
can be tested by running the following simple regression:
¹ gi = ® + ¯ lnPi0 + ²i (1)
where ¹ gi denotes the mean growth rate of country i over the sample period and Pi0
represents country i's initial productivity level.4 A signi¯cantly negative estimate of ¯
con¯rms ¯-convergence.
The notion of ¾-convergence hypothesizes that income dispersion across economies
decreases over time, i.e., ¾T < ¾0, where ¾0 and ¾T are the respective cross-country
standard deviations of incomes in the ¯rst and last period. Carree and Klomp (1997)










1 ¡ (^ ¯T + 1)
(2)
where N is the number of countries and ^ ¯is the estimate of ¯ from the ¯-convergence
regression. This S statistic has a standard normal distribution under H0 : ¾T ¡ ¾0 = 0.
As summarized in Sala-i-Martin (1996), ¯-convergence is a necessary but not su±cient
condition for ¾-convergence. Strong ¯-convergence and a violation of ¾-convergence can
coexist under two possible scenarios. The ¯rst scenario is overshooting, where the initially
poorer countries grow so fast that they not only catch up with the richer ones but over-
reach them. This is not very common for aggregate economies but more likely to happen
at the disaggregate levels. The second possible scenario is the case of regression to the
mean (the Galton's Fallacy). As critiqued by Friedman (1992) and Quah (1993), when
there is regression to the mean, a signi¯cantly negative ¯ can be obtained even though
the economies are not converging at all and across-country dispersion is enlarging.
4Following BJ, average growth rate is constructed as the trend coe±cient from a regression of the log
level on a constant and a linear trend.
23 Data
Data are drawn from the EU KLEMS Database, March 2007 release (see Timmer et al.
2007). The 17 OECD countries are the EU-15, Japan and the USA. Labor productivity is
measured as value added per hour worked in 1997 industry-speci¯c PPP German Euros.
4 Convergence Test Results
4.1 Results for One-Digit Sector
A gestalt impression of convergence by sector is provided by Figure 1. A conver-
gence trend is fairly evident in several sectors (especially agriculture and EGW), but
there appears to be no evidence of convergence in manufacturing. Table 1 provides the
convergence test results: the OLS estimates of the ¯ coe±cients (along with relevant
statistics), the standard deviation of the natural log of labor productivity in both 1975
and 2004, and the S statistic. Except for manufacturing, all the estimated ¯ coe±cients
are signi¯cantly negative at 1% level. The overall picture, for total industry (the sum of
all six one-digit sectors), is that of strongly signi¯cant ¯-convergence.
¾-convergence is signi¯cant in agriculture, mining, EGW, services and total industry.
The standard deviation of productivity levels in construction did fall, but the decrease
is not statistically signi¯cant. Manufacturing again constitutes an outlier as the only
sector for which ¾ increased during the sample period. However, despite the fact that
the ¾ in manufacturing has increased, its absolute value in 2004 is still lower than that in
agriculture, mining and EGW, all of which exhibit strong ¾-convergence. It might well
be the case that technological catch-up had already occurred largely in manufacturing.
Dispersion of labor productivity in mining is the greatest and this might reasonably be
attributable to the di®erences in the sizes of the mining sector in individual countries,
which, in turn, is likely due to di®erences in natural resources and mineral reserves.
Our results at the sectoral level thus strongly support the BJ conclusion that con-
vergence does not exist in total manufacturing, despite the fact that their results are
potentially misleading because of the use of inappropriate PPPs. On the other hand, we
¯nd, in contrast to BJ, that all sectors other than manufacturing|including agriculture
and mining (in which BJ ¯nd no convergence)|are converging.
4.2 Results for Manufacturing Industries
As discussed earlier, total manufacturing is composed of production in rather hetero-
geneous goods. It is necessary to examine more disaggregate industries to have a better
understanding of the diverging trend in total manufacturing.
We carry out ¯-convergence and ¾-convergence tests for all the two-digit industries in
manufacturing.5 Tests results are presented in Table 3.6 Despite the fact that the overall
manufacturing sector does not converge among the OECD countries under examination,
5Due to data unavailability, for some industries, the country group includes less countries or the time
period starts from 1977 instead of 1975. Detailed information is available upon request.
6The industry classi¯cation is based on ISIC Rev.3.
3many manufacturing industries do. A signi¯cantly negative ¯ estimate is obtained for all
manufacturing industries except textile and textile products (ISIC 17 to 18) and rubber
and plastics (ISIC 25).
Signi¯cant ¾-convergence is not found in several industries (i.e., ISIC 15 to 16, 17
to 18, 20, 22, 24 and 25). More speci¯cally, the cross-country dispersion increased three
industries|textile and textile products (ISIC 17 to 18), chemical and chemical products
(ISIC 24) and rubber and plastic (ISIC 25)|two of which (ISIC 17 to 18 and 25) are
exactly those with no evidence for ¯-convergence evidence. For chemical and chemical
products (ISIC 24), ¯-convergence is not statistically rejected while there is a signi¯cant
increase in ¾. This is the overshooting case discussed earlier. Ireland, with relatively low
productivity in producing chemical products back in 1975, achieved tremendous produc-
tivity increase over the sample period and was well above all other countries in 2004. The
pattern is similar for food, beverages and tobacco (ISIC 15 to 16) and printing, publish-
ing and reproduction (ISIC 22), where ¯-convergence is statistically signi¯cant while the
standard deviation of the distribution remains roughly the same. Again, Ireland enjoyed
very fast growth from a relatively low position.
Combining both ¯-convergence and ¾-convergence tests, we conclude that most man-
ufacturing industries do converge. The non-convergence trend in total manufacturing is
mainly attributable to divergence in a few industries (mainly ISIC 17 to 18 and 25).
4.3 Results for Service Industries
As the services sector is the largest one-digit sector in the economies, trend in services
can have a substantial e®ect on that at the economy-wide level. Total services contain
many heterogeneous industries. Some services, such as ¯nancial services, are fairly trad-
able, while others, such as community, social and personal services, are local and less
likely to be traded. It would be interesting to see whether and how industries in services
might di®er regarding convergence.
Almost all industries in services are converging, according to results presented in
Table 4. The only exception is post and telecommunication (ISIC 64), which does not
exhibit statistically signi¯cant ¯-convergence. Estimates of ¯ in all others are strongly
signi¯cant. The ¾-convergence tests fail to reject the no convergence null for a few
industries (ISIC I, 64 and L), but the standard deviation in all industries, including post
and telecommunication (ISIC 64), has decreased. Strong convergence trends in service
industries might be attributable to the easy transferability of services technologies.
5 A Counterfactual Analysis
To better understand the mechanism behind the strong convergence evidence at the
aggregate level, it is also important to pay attention to changes in industrial labor shares.
When labor shifts occur among industries featuring di®erent producibility levels, produc-
tivity performance at the aggregate level can be a®ected non-trivially. For the OECD
countries included, the largest sector|total services|is the only sector which expanded
in terms of labor share, accounting for, on average, 55% of total working hours in 1975 and
4more than 70% by 2004. The average share of total manufacturing, the second largest sec-
tor, shrank from around 30% in 1975 to 18% in 2004. Other sectors generally accounted
for many fewer working hours, holding, altogether, only around 10% of total industry in
2004. There is also considerable heterogeneity in the growth rates of labor productivity
across sectors. On average, labor productivity in manufacturing, mining, and EGW grow
the fastest while growth in services and construction is relatively slow. To assess the
separate contributions of within-sector productivity growth and across-sector labor shifts
to the aggregate level convergence, we propose two counterfactuals of labor productivity
for total industry in the last period.
Denote labor productivity for country i's total industry in the last period as piT. Also
denote sector j's initial labor productivity and hour share as pij0 and sij0, and those in the
last period as pijT and sijT, respectively. It is straightforward that piT =
P
j sijT ¢pijT. We
construct two counterfactuals for piT as ^ piT =
P
j sij0 ¢pijT and ~ piT =
P
j sijT ¢pij0, where
^ piT is the counterfactual for piT if there had been no labor shifts across sectors, while ~ piT
is the counterfactual if there had been no productivity growth in any individual sectors.
We then calculate the corresponding counterfactual growth rates for total industry under
the construction and run the convergence tests. The results show that labor shifts across
sectors do not have a signi¯cant e®ect on convergence in total industry. As a matter
of fact, if there had only been growth in individual sectors but no labor shifts across
sectors, the counterfactual (^ piT) would be very close to the actual value. Correspondingly,
the convergence test results based on the counterfactual reveal the same pattern, i.e.,
there would be both strong ¯-convergence and strong ¾-convergence in total industry.
However, if there had been only labor shifts but no growth, labor producibility in total
industry would not have converged among the countries. Evidently, productivity growth
in individual sectors explains the convergence of aggregate productivity among the OECD
economies.
We can apply the same exercise to total manufacturing and total services to explore
how growth in two-digit industries and changes in labor share composition a®ect the the
convergence/nonconvergence trends in the corresponding one-digit sectors. Results shows
that neither productivity growth in two-digit manufacturing industries nor labor shifts
within total manufacturing has contributed to convergence|both cause cross-economy
dispersion (¾) in total manufacturing to increase. Particularly, if there had been no pro-
ductivity growth in any manufacturing industry, we would obtain a signi¯cantly positive
¯ estimate, i.e., change in labor share composition within total manufacturing forces the
OECD countries to diverge. Convergence in services is mainly driven by productivity
growth within two-digit services industries.
6 Future Directions
Using newly constructed industry-speci¯c PPPs, we establish the empirics regarding
productivity convergence at the disaggregate levels. For a group of 17 OECD countries
over the period 1975-2004, our results provide evidence for convergence in all one-digit
sectors except total manufacturing. However, we ¯nd that many manufacturing industries
do converge. Within the services sector, almost all industries show strong convergence
5trends. A simple counterfactual analysis that separates the contributions of productivity
growth and labor shifts reveals that convergence at the aggregate level is mainly driven
by productivity growth.
Data unavailability imposes serious restrictions on research regarding productivity
convergence at the disaggregate levels. Lacking internationally comparable capital data,
we can only assess labor productivity. When such data become available, the more eco-
nomically interesting multi-factor productivity should be analyzed. Another interesting
direction to pursue, with capital data, is the growth accounting exercise based on data
envelopment analysis (DEA) as in Kumar and Russell (2002). Such analysis would help
identify the underlying driving forces of industrial growth and convergence, and their
respective contributions to aggregate cross-country trends.
Future research may also address questions such as how international trade can a®ect
productivity convergence at the disaggregate levels (especially for manufacturing indus-
tries). The fact that convergence does not occur in total manufacturing seems to falsify
the conventional wisdom that spillovers from international trade and R&D investment
would speed up technical transfer and facilitate convergence. Then could international
trade impede productivity convergence among trade partners because it creates spe-
cialization in producing di®erent traded goods that might be associated with di®erent
production technologies?
The OECD countries in our sample are fairly homogeneous in nature. A natural
question to ask is: if more heterogeneous countries (such as those with low productivity
levels) are included, will the convergence pattern remain the same for all industries? Will
there be \twin clubs" for individual industries that are found by Quah (1996, 1997) for
aggregate economies? Data covering more heterogeneous economies will also help the
understanding of convergence at the disaggregate levels.
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